pendent as to be uncertain.2 Still more especially, the independent vote in the "pivotal" or doubtful territory must be given careful consideration. As a consequence of the electoral college system, presidential elections are won or lost by victory or defeat in key states. It thus becomes easy to describe the perfect candidate. He is one who has demonstrated vote-getting ability repeatedly in large doubtful territory, but one who at the same time has avoided qualities that would be offensive to the faithful elsewhere. Now what about party leaders on the national level such as Vice-Presidents, Cabinet members, members of Congress, etc.? For one reason or another they are generally regarded as "unavailable." Vice-Presidents have no opportunity to demonstrate vote-getting ability in their own right. They may be considered as having ridden into office on the coat-tail of the presidential candidate, and the office itself provides little or no opportunity for demonstration of capacities for statesmanship.
Cabinet system, become unavailable. Such people, if they are active in Congress, must take stands on national issues-on many national issues. They may make friends from such stands; they will inevitably make enemies. They thereby acquire labels such as Taft's anti-labor label via the Taft-Hartley Act, or Vandenberg's internationalism, or Martin's isolationism. They lose increasingly the quality of vagueness which would make it possible for them to straddle national issues and to present formulae to the public which are capable of varied interpretation. Naturally, men who have not been active in Congress such as Senator Harding prior to his nomination in 1920 may not be at so great disadvantage, particularly if this negative quality of membership in Congress can be countered by one or more positive qualities of availability such as Harding's residence in the pivotal state of Ohio. On the whole, however, national level party leaders have a low priority.
State party leaders are preferred. The perfect candidate would be a happily married Protestant who has been successively elected Governor of a large pivotal state, who has not been involved in any sex or other scandals, who is neither too rich nor too poor, who is photogenic, and who has a good platform and radio manner. It is not easy to find the perfect candidate, perhaps, but the favorites are those who most nearly approximate perfection.
Public opinion polls are tending to modify this type of analysis somewhat. The scientific-sampling technique provides a new method of demonstrating vote-getting ability. Willkie, for example, had not been elected to any public office prior to the Republican convention in 1940. Nevertheless, his popularity, stimulated by a liberal expenditure of money and by bang-wagon psychology, had been demonstrated by public opinion polls prior to the opening of the convention. As demonstrations of candidate popularity, public opinion polls may be as significant, if not more significant, in the future, than popular votes.
Unfortunately, from the point of view of party strategy as well as from the point of view of democratic government, conventions do not always nominate the people's choice. There is no assurance of strategic wisdom in conventions composed as they are today. Many things may happen. Favorites may destroy favorites through their unwillingness to compromise. Or the nomination of a favorite may be blocked by the determined opposition of the "field", i.e., a combination of delegates pledged to "favorite sons." Or again, the convention may nominate a "dark horse" either as a last resort or in the interests of party harmony. Thus men may be nominated who are not even moderately powerful in state party leadership.
Once a candidate has been nominated by a convention, however, he begins to rise to the national leadership of his party. In the interests of harmony and strategy and in the hope of a share in the spoils of victory, party leaders everywhere climb on the band wagon and rally to the support of the candidate. In fact, potential patronage at this stage may be more effective in placing a man in a position of leadership than real patronage at a later time. There are no disappointed job seekers until appointments begin to be made. Candidates have learned the strategic significance of insisting that no commitments have been made. Dewey's acceptance speech in Philadelphia in 1948 presents an excellent illustration of this point. Such statements are not only strategically significant within the party organization but they are popular with the public as well. Voters generally look upon deals and bargains as sordid business. Nevertheless, deals-are made and they are probably an essential part of the great game of politics. As the frequently-quoted Lincoln remark indicates, the deals are not always made by the candidate himself. He may be able to say honestly that he has incurred no obligations.3 In all probability they will have been made by his managers, however, and many of them will have to be fulfilled if the party is victorious in November. It is quite possible that, in their enthusiasm, a candidate's managers may make conflicting promises, some of which cannot possibly be kept. Some people may be double-crossed or wounded feelings may have to be salved by substitute balm. However that may be, deals are almost inevitable in sharply contested pre-convention and convention campaigns.
Uncertainty about these promises leads to wild speculation about future plans. Political columnists, newspaper editors, and radio commentators have field days making predictions as to possible Cabinet and other high level appointments. Long lists of names are presented to the public from which such selections are sure to be made. The candidates refrain from comment beyond saying they have been too busy to think about such matters. A candidate of the party in power seeking reelection must try to find the middle ground between an appeal to the security of those now in office and hungry office seekers outside. The opposition party candidate may promise a big house-cleaning. This is a good rallying cry for the party, and the tax-conscious voting public will respond to it sympathetically if it does not resemble too closely a raid on the career service. The public has now come to regard the merit principle as sound. Confirmation of this is found in the fact that party platforms now regularly pledge protection to the career service.
Political parties live on patronage and the spoils of politics. Nevertheless, a newly elected President would not be wise to raid the civil service too extensively. To do so might produce an unfavorable public reaction. Moreover, it would be poor political strategy. A politically-wise President will conserve his patronage and distribute it discreetly.
During his first few months in office a new President is in a relatively favorable position. Critics, both inside and outside of Congress, are somewhat restrained. There is a tendency to wait and see-to give him a chance. Then too, there does not yet exist that accumulation of errors which inevitably comes with time.
Prior to his inauguration the President-elect will have reached decisions on his cabinet appointments and these appointees will go into office with him. There are possibilities here for strengthening his hold on the party. In addition to the deals made in his behalf, strong rival contenders in the convention may have to be recognized even if no deals were made with them. Cabinet as Postmaster General where he will be close at hand for advice and guidance on patronage and other political matters. But even his campaign manager may desire and be able to demand something better. Mark Hanna, McKinley's exceptionally competent campaign manager, asked for a seat in the Senate and a place was made for him in that body. Ed Flynn, who assisted Jim Farley in the management of Roosevelt's campaign, also wanted a seat in the Senate. Plans were actually developed, according to Flynn,5 to make this possible. Senator Copeland was to be asked to resign to accept appointment as ambassador to Germany. Governor Lehman was then to appoint Flynn to fill the vacancy in the Senate. Lehman agreed on the condition that Al Smith would say that he did not want the appointment. This Al Smith refused to do and the plan collapsed.
It might be argued that a President would be using bad political judgment in placing top-level party leaders in his Cabinet since they or some of them might overshadow him. Presidents-elect and Presidents, being human, are doubtless not unaware of this possibility. Logic and common sense would suggest, however, that the argument has no validity. A strong Cabinet would surely make a President appear stronger rather than weaker. Moreover, there would surely seem to be less risk of scandals through inefficient administration. If any of the Cabinet members should have presidential aspirations, so much the better. Assuredly, they would be strategically better Cabinet members and department heads as a result. No such aspiring presidential candidate would try to maneuver a duly-elected President of his own party out of office until the latter had served his traditional two terms. A former Vice-President who had been elevated to the Presidency by the death of his predecessor might be an exception to this rule. was allowed to go before a committee of Congress and recommend a larger air force than the President had recommended and nothing was done about it. Moreover, a Cabinet member who is criticized for corruption or inefficiency may be dropped by the President with some assurance that the public will praise him for this bit of house-cleaning; or, safe in office until the end of his fixed tenure, he can rely on the voters to forget the episode by the time the next election rolls around. Neither Coolidge nor Hoover was President at the time of the Teapot Dome oil scandals. Nevertheless, both of them were attending Cabinet meetings regularly at the time and the conclusion might be drawn either that they must have known what was happening or that they were very stupid not to know. And yet there is no conclusive proof that either of them suffered politically since both of them were later elected to the Presidency by overwhelming margins.
In one other respect the President is in a favorable position in respect to Cabinet posts. Although Cabinet appointments are subject to senatorial approval, the Senate does not, as a matter of practice, create any serious difficulties. In a few instances the Senate has refused to confirm the President's nominations. On the whole, however, the Senate adheres to the tradition that these people are the President's official family and that he should be permitted to have unrestricted freedom of action in selecting them.
The Senate maintains somewhat the same tradition in respect to appointments to judgeships. Whatever the reasons may be, the President's nominations to judicial posts are usually confirmed. It is true that a few big battles have been fought over some of these nominations in recent decades. The most noteworthy are those of Brandeis, Hughes, Parker, and Black. These were not partisan conflicts, however, but conflicts over the "major premises" of the men in question. Brandeis was regarded by his opponents as too liberal and too pro-labor; Hughes by his opponents as too pro-big-business; Parker by the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People and by labor groups as antiNegro and anti-labor; while Black was denounced for alleged membership in the Ku Klux Klan. In Black's case the charge of Klanism was largely a smoke-screen to cover up the fact that his opponents really thought he was too liberal. Notwithstanding sharp struggles in each case, all of the appointments were confirmed except that of Judge Parker.
Judgeships are life-time appointments and are held in high esteem. Thus vacancies in these positions are rich plums. The President, in filling them, is not unmindful of party politics. Most of his appointments are made from his own political party. Nevertheless, he is often more concerned with interest loyalties, i.e., with social and economic attitudes, than with party loyalties, particularly in filling vacancies on the Supreme Court. The clashes which we hear so much about on the Supreme Court are not partisan clashes but interest and attitude conflicts. These attitude conflicts stand out so sharply that it is inevitable that the President take them into consideration as vacancies occur. These "major premises" in men's minds may be unexpressed at the time of the appointment and the President may guess wrong. Holmes was more liberal than Theodore Roosevelt thought him to be and McReynolds was more reactionary than Wilson thought him to be.
Political considerations may be present even when a President appoints a member of the opposition party to a judgeship. He thereby gets credit for broadmindedness and yet indirect partisan benefits may be derived. President Truman appointed a Republican, Senator Harold Burton, to the Supreme Court. In doing so he removed a Republican from the Senate and provided the Democratic Governor of Ohio with an opportunity to appoint a Democrat to take his place. His own party was thus made stronger by one vote in the Senate and Burton, a moderate liberal, was regarded both inside and outside the Senate as a good addition to the Court.
Life tenure limits turnover in federal judgeships and thus The statute creating the Federal Trade Commission authorized the President to remove commissioners for "inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office." However, President Roosevelt gave no other reasons for demanding Humphrey's resignation than differences of opinion on policy and belief that the work of the Commission would be better handled by personnel of his own choosing.
Under the Constitution the executive power is vested in a President. Thus the essential constitutional question presented by the Humphrey case was whether the creation by Congress of such independent boards or commissions as this one could be regarded as an encroachment on the executive powers of the President. The Court said that it was not an encroachment on the executive power.7 The reasoning of the Court is somewhat difficult to follow but it placed considerable emphasis on the alleged fact that such "independent" agencies were designed to perform "quasi-legislative" or "quasi-judicial" powers. The following excerpts from its opinion summarizes its explanation:
The Federal Trade Commission is an administrative body created by Congress to carry into effect legislative policies embodied in the statute in accordance with the legislative standard therein prescribed, and to perform other specified duties as a legislative or as a judicial aid. Such a body cannot in any proper sense be characterized as an arm or an eye of the executive. Its duties are performed without executive leave and, in the contemplation of the statute, must be free from executive control. . . . To the extent that it exercises any executive function, as distinguished from executive power in the constitutional sense, it does so in the discharge and effectuation of its quasilegislative or quasi-judicial powers, or as an agency of the legislative or judicial departments of the government . . . The President's power of appointment is also subject to both practical and legal limitations. Those who are under the merit system must meet the standards set by the Civil Service Commission. The "rule of three," under which an appointment is made from one of the three highest of those who are eligible, offers some opportunity for manipulation in behalf of party patronage. Since this rule also paves the way for the expression of race, religious and other forms of prejudice, it is likely to be superseded sooner or later by the "rule of one" under which the highest person on the eligible list is appointed. Greater confidence in the evaluation techniques of the Civil Service Commission will help bring this about. While such a charge is probably desirable, it should be noted that most of the gossip about manipulation of the "rule of three" is exaggerated. The possibilities for manipulation are not great.
Congress has further limited the President's powers of appointment by classifying almost twenty thousand positions as "superior" offices within the meaning of the Constitution, thereby making them subject to senatorial confirmation. Appointments to the diplomatic and consular service and to the Supreme Court must be so confirmed. The Constitution requires it. For all except a few hundred positions, however, the classification is unnecessary. They might better be allocated to the President alone or to heads of departments. This is rich patronage since many of these offices are key positions with good salaries. But the President loses much of it to members of the Senate through application of the unwritten, but none-the-less iron-clad, rule of senatorial courtesy. Under this rule the President is obligated to consult the member or members of the Senate of his own party, if any, from each state for appointments to positions located in those states. If he fails to do so the Senate will refuse to confirm the appointment. As a consequence, these nominations are really made by Senators. Thus valuable patronage is lost to the President. This is a triple loss. He is unable to use this patronage for trading purposes or to strengthen the party organization; he cannot assure himself that well-qualified people are appointed; and he cannot escape blame if scandals arise. There is even a fourth loss; he must exercise great caution in removing such appointees lest he make an enemy of the Senator who made the appointment.
In the interval between sessions of Congress, the President may make recess appointments which hold until the end of the next session of the Senate. If the Senate, at this next session, refuses to confirm the appointment, the President may give the same person another recess appointment. In a few instances Presidents have defied the Senate by keeping appointees in office over long periods of time in spite of senatorial refusal to confirm the appointment. Congress has undertaken to make this practice Patronage is a tremendously important tool in party politics. The fact must not be forgotten that it is also always a risk and sometimes a serious liability. The number of office-seekers may exceed the number of offices-to-be-filled. For every one person appointed there may be others bitterly disappointed. Even the person who received the appointment may be disgruntled. He may have been aiming for something higher and be insulted because he did not get it. Presidents and political parties pay stiff prices at times for the rewards which they reap from patronage and spoils.
One primary objective in the distribution of patronage is to get the time, energy, and financial resources of those who are on the receiving end. On the national level, the Hatch Clean Politics Acts have done serious damage to these possibilities. With the exception of a few top-level policy-making officers, the Hatch Acts forbid government employees who are paid in whole or in part out of federal funds from participating in politics. They may not serve on party committees or engage in active campaign work. Moreover, federal officers and employees are prohibited from soliciting campaign contributions from other federal officers and employees, and no one is permitted to solicit or receive campaign funds on federal property. Penalties are provided for violations. Admittedly the legislation is vague, evasion easy, and enforcement is difficult. Even so, it virtually destroys some of the most valuable assets of the patronage system.
The setting in which a President is compelled to deal with Congress is more important than patronage. A President who is dealing with a Congress in which his own political party has an overwhelming majority in both houses is far better off than one who is compelled to deal with an opposition or even one where his own political party has only a small margin of control. Most legislation is bipartisan. The roll calls in Congress indicate that economic and geographical considerations out-weigh party considerations. Intraparty struggles are even sharper sometimes than inter-party conflict. Nevertheless, partisan considerations are there and they will have a great influence on the techniques which a President may use in his relationship with Congress.
Congress is not held in high esteem by the public. Hence a President can usually produce a favorable public response if he criticizes Congress in press conferences or in White House chats or in swings-around-the-country. It would be an admission of weakness, however, and a self-destructive undertaking for a President to criticize a Congress in which his own party is in power.
Similarly, congressional investigating committees, dominated by members of the President's own party, may be expected to be somewhat more sympathetic than committees controlled by the opposition. There is no guarantee that this will be the case, however, as illustrated by the Dies committee on Un-American activities in the Roosevelt period. Although a fellow-Democrat, Congressman Dies seemed determined to discredit New Dealers. It would be difficult to defend the proposition that this committee was any less political than the Thomas committee, even though the latter, dominated by Republicans, seemed determined, in the midst of the presidential campaign in the summer of 1948, to discredit the Truman administration. The inevitable jealousy of congressional leaders of the executive branch set the stage for this approach.
Perhaps the greatest handicap to the President in his relationship to Congress is the seniority rule. This rule, simply stated, is an automatic or mechanical device for the selection of committee chairmen. By application of the rule of seniority, the chairmanship of each standing committee goes automatically to the member of the majority party with the longest period of service on that particular committee. Minor deviations will occur of course. A member may be compelled to forego one committee chairmanship to accept another, or he may be persuaded because of age or illness to decline a chairmanship. On the whole, however. committee chairmanships are such coveted plums that men will demand them when their turns come regardless of senility, ill health, or other handicaps.
As ex-Congressman Jerry Voorhis has pointed out, those Congressmen who get good committee assignments early in their service in Congress have an advantage over the others. Voorhis was first elected to the Seventy-fifth Congress and asked at that time to be assigned to the Committee on Agriculture. However, it was not until the Seventy-eighth Congress that he was able to get this committee assignment. By that time he was outranked on the committee by three other members who had had from two to four years less congressional service than he had had. Those committeemen who had been elected to Congress at the same time he was elected so far outranked him as to be "almost out of sight. In foreign policy, presidential leadership is an established tradition as illustrated by the Monroe Doctrine, the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, etc. Unlike other chief executives, however, the President's treaty recommendations may be blocked by one-third of the Senators. Too, his foreign policy may be stifled by an economy-minded or isolationist-minded congressional leadership. While it is true that the Senate and Congress as a whole have generally accepted presidential guidance in this area, the President. nevertheless, has been handicapped by the lack of a strong tradition of a bi-partisan or non-partisan foreign policy. The State Department has been trying to establish a trend in that direction in recent years by maintaining close contacts with congressional leaders. Even so, the temptation to create issues out of foreign policies as well as domestic policies is very strong, particularly in campaign periods. Dewey, for example, in ad-dressing an audience of Italian-Americans in August, 1948, was unable to resist the temptation to bring the ultimate disposition of the former Italian colonies into the presidential campaign despite the fact that the Defense Department and the State Department did not believe that it was in the national interest to have the question raised at that time.
Three fundamental questions run through any discussion of the President and party politics. Do we want party responsibility? If we want it, is there any practical possibility of getting it? If we want it and can get it, should leadership be placed in Congress or in the President? Certainly we do not have a strong tradition of party responsibility in this country. The structure of our government has stood in the way of its development. Consequently, the voters have become increasingly skeptical about the value of the party system. They fail to realize that political parties are an essential characteristic of democratic government and that the public would benefit greatly from party responsibility.11 It would place public welfare above politics and national interest above special interest.
But how can party responsibility be accomplished? Should it be via minor modifications in mechanisms such as the formation of policy committees and the elimination of the seniority rule? Or should more far-reaching reforms be undertaken? A legislative cabinet might be created. The off-year elections might be abolished. Since discontented opposition party voters tend to turn out better in off years and thereby to increase the opposition party's voting strength in Congress sometimes to the point of control of one or both houses, these off-year elections are nuisances and probably should be eliminated by constitutional amendment. The two branches could also be brought into closer harmony by an amendment or even a tradition which would require the President to resign if Congress comes under the control of the opposition party. The opposition would then be compelled to fill the vacancy.
Congressional domination over the Presidency might also be accomplished at least in part by giving the members of Congress more power in presidential nominations. Something in the nature of joint congressional caucuses of the two houses of Congress In general these proposals are based on the assumption that leadership and control should rest with Congress. It is assumed that the two branches should be brought into a more harmonious relationship by making Congress dominant. There is little likelihood that such proposals could be made popular or that they would give the public what it wants. The tradition of the separation of powers is strong and congressional jealousy of the executive branch is an inevitable consequence. The members of Congress are generally more interested in Presidents whom they can manage than in strong Presidents. Moreover, Congress is not held in high esteem. The public looks to the President for leadership and regards him as more representative of the general interest. Congress, it believes, is more representative of special interests. As the problems of government become more complex, the public tends to demand stronger chief executives. Hence reforms in the processes of nominating and electing the President are more likely to produce popular response. More extensive and more genuine use of direct primaries in the selection of delegates would help. More seriousness in the nominating conventions themselves and fewer deals in smoke-filled rooms would be popular. Elimination or at least modification of the electoral college system would at least place the election process in a safer position. The election of a minority President would not go down as well with the public today as it has in the past. Elevation of the Vice-President to a more important place in the government is a badly needed reform. Anything that would raise that office to a higher level of public esteem would result in a higher level of candidate for the office.
These objectives of securing the nomination and election to the Presidency and Vice-Presidency of men of greater public esteem and greater stature may be accentuated by more extensive use of scientific public opinion polls and more wide-spread radio and television coverage of campaigns, conventions, and other political activities. Men with experience in politics, men with ability and with qualities of leadership as candidates and in the White House can get results in party leadership, in leadership in Congress, and in leadership of the public where dull and incompetent men will fail. The greatest hope at present lies in that direction.
